Between Secularist and Jihadist Bodes, Egypt and Sudan in Crossroads by Mahmoud, Mahgoub El-Tigani
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
21 
Between Secularist and Jihadist Bodes, Egypt and 
Sudan in Crossroads 
 
 
 
Mahgoub El-Tigani Mahmoud 
Tennessee State University 
 
doi: 10.19044/esj.2016.v12n26p21    URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n26p21 
 
Abstract  
 The societal conflicts between Secularist groups and Jihadist militants 
on the role religious orientations played in the state democratization, social 
justice, human rights, and population development posited national exigencies 
un-decisively met by governments of the African and Arab regions. Part one 
of our research theorized three typologies shaping the challenges of similar 
conflicts in the Arab-African states of Egypt and Sudan. The typologies 
symbolized a Sufi culture perpetuating Muslims’ humanitarian relations; 
Secularist thought excluding the politics of faith; and Jihadist reactionaries 
manipulating symbolic representation of religion in the striving for power 
domains. Lacking in serenity the Sufi culture maintained for ages by popular 
prevalence, the Jihadist reactionaries sponsored a theocratic militancy that 
generated instability by excessive violence. Entrenched in non-democratic 
authoritative systems, the state failed in both countries to end peacefully the 
deepened tensions of the ongoing contradictions. Preserving the popular 
culture and supporting democratic governance, the Sufi/Secularist groups 
would probably continue to resist the theocratic dogma that evidently 
penetrated the region. Part two of the research proposed a study on the 
typologies’ dynamics to project the extent of political integrity in the future of 
Sudan and Egypt. This paper comprised a brief summary of part one of the 
analysis. 
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Introduction 
 This research consisted of two parts: 1) analyzing a societal conflict in 
Egypt and Sudan in religious, political, and developmental terms; and 2) 
proposing a follow-up field research to rationalize a predictable future from 
the findings. In introduction, Part one discussed major features of the state’s 
hegemony over societal relations, and popular uprisings in the African and 
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Arab regions. Part one would briefly inform about the research significance 
and objectives; the Jihadist (also reactionaries), Secularist, and Sufi 
movements; issues of societal inequalities; the escalated ideological 
confrontations; and conclusions.  
 The unabated conflicts between governments and communities to 
remedy the tensions on social injustices and anti-democratic governance, as 
well as the quest for social stability and even development moved largely 
African countries, including the Arab League states of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Somalia, Sudan and Libya, unto the 21st century with much more difficulties 
than they had experienced in the 20ieth century. Moreover in Syria, the civil 
war soaked the country in brutal ferocities alongside multiple diplomatic and 
military actions by Iran, Russia, France, the United States, and Turkey. This 
state of affairs was a symptom of deep striving for societal equalities and social 
justice in all aspects of life. The United Nations, the African Union, and the 
Arab League emphasized the terrorist side of the escalated tensions between 
governments and the contending parties. Security Council Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (2006) recommended “tackling the conditions conducive 
to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; and ensuring 
respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism.” 
On December 15th, 2015, 34 Saudi-led Muslim nations joined a military 
alliance to fight terrorism; Iran, Iraq, and Syria did not join the alliance (BBC 
News, 2015). Nonetheless, the situation moved on to a ceaseless war. 
 This global crisis had been erupting over an East-West ideological 
differential and a developmental ridge accumulating for decades in the post-
war era of the 20ieth century up to contemporary decades of the 21st century. 
In the 1990s, it was evident that African societies, communities and families, 
held stronger coherency and integrity than their ruling states: ‘Irrelevant to 
others,’ the persistence of grinding poverty, ethno-regional cleavages, and the 
cult of presidents for life reduced Africa to “a symbolic presence on the world 
stage… On the global level, African governments lack resources and are 
perceived as ineffective, corrupt, and undemocratic” (Bradshaw & Wallace, 
1997:83). Oil discoveries swelled some states in corruption and civil wars. By 
2000s, the common denominator of prevailing contradictions pointed to a 
mounting trend of unprecedented struggles between militant groups and the 
systems of rule in Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, 
Mali, Congo and Niger, etc.  
 In the Middle East and North African “Arab Spring” movements, the 
state with bureaucratic structures, influential functions, and authoritative 
managers had been a key stimulus of the events that led to massive popular 
movements and an actual mover of the consequences that resulted in the 
harassment of labor by new bureaucratic managements. This occurred instead 
of new state structures that revolutionaries anticipated eagerly in accordance 
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with Marx’s prophesy. Formal power structures transcended the traditional 
and charismatic models of authority by excessive bureaucratization, as Max 
Weber would have firmly professed, since “the inhumane rationalizing trends 
of the modern world order could not be brushed aside by a political 
movement” (Ashley & Orenstein, 2001:247). Being the most overbearing 
power, apart from civil militancy, the same and one state structures and 
managerial sectors were also heirs of the revolutionary climates the 
disenchanted labor originated and took to the streets after generations of 
suppressed unions, only to prepare the grounds for a new take-over by adaptive 
governmental rupture in the absence of a well-orchestrated political juncture. 
 This portrayal was not confined to a single country in the Arab region; 
it was indeed accommodative of the Arab Spring chain that exploded in 
Tunisia, moved unto neighboring nations, and went as far as Syria, Bahrain, 
Yemen, and Sudan in varying degrees (Davis, 2013; Gana, 2013). There were 
certainly earlier uprisings among these and other Muslim nations (Hafez, 
2003) exhibiting “individual characteristics” of each case from earlier times 
(Moore, 1970); nevertheless, the commonalities of culture, social structure, 
and state functions in these societies made it possible to focus closely on 
Egypt, the biggest population of the Arab nations, to analyze major features 
of the spring popular uprisings, as well as Sudan, the biggest country in 
African space (before independence of South Sudan in 2011), whose popular 
movements continued unrelentingly to resist succeeding dictatorial regimes 
from within a few years after the country’s independence in 1956 up to the 
current dictatorship (1989 to the present). 
 We reflected our research project closely on Egypt and Sudan – Arab-
African peoples sharing long periods of political melees to attain a democratic 
life free from despotism of the single-party single-candidate presidential 
systems (Ibrahim, 1996; Lobban Jr., 2010; Davis, 2013). The World Bank 
(2016) located the two countries among the lower middle income African 
nations. There were obvious variations, however, in the population size (EG 
89.58 million; SU 39.35 million); urban population (EG 43%, SU 34% of 
total); economic status (EG GDP at market price $301.5 billion at 2.2% annual 
growth; SU $73.81 billion at 3.1% annual growth); and industry (EG 39% of 
GDP; SU 20.4%); but they shared similar agriculture percent of GDP (EG 
11.1; SU 10.5). Education, health, life expectancy at birth, and poverty 
indicators showed some similarities and a few differences: EG’s adult literacy, 
15 + years both sexes, was 75 by 2013; SU’s was 74; SU’s health expenditure 
was 8.4% of GDP; EG’s 5.6%; EG’s life expectancy at birth total years was 
71; SU’s was 63 years. EG external debt (first quarter of 2016) $53.4b total; 
and SU’s was $45.1b by end of 2013. EG’s poverty trend by national standard, 
headcount ratio% was 25.2 by 2010 whereas SU’s ratio was 46.5. 
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 Sharing long centuries of ancient relationships, River Nile geopolitics 
and colonial history, Egypt (in agreement with Great Britain) granted Sudan 
the right to self-determination in 1955. The two nations collaborated closely 
during the national liberation movement in the Arab and African regions 
throughout the Cold War Era, and exercised political attempts with little 
success to become a unified state by al-Takamul (economic integration) 
agreements. The advent of the Jihadist military rule in Sudan since 1989 
marked a deteriorating trend in the political and diplomatic relations. The U.S. 
Department of State’s fact sheet (2015) stated that “Sudan established links 
with international terrorist organizations resulting in the United States to 
designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993.” An assassination 
attempt on president Mubarak in Addis Ababa (June 25, 1995) was directly 
linked with Khartoum (Reeves, 2004); and later in 2009, the international 
Criminal Court (2010) accused Omer al-Bashir, the Brotherhood’s coup leader 
and state president, of crimes against humanity in Darfur. 
 Following a popular uprising that toppled Mubarak, the enthusiasm of 
Khartoum to support the Jihadist successor colored the bilateral relations with 
suspicions and caution, despite recent coordination to come to agreement on 
Ethiopia’s dam across the Blue Nile, the vibrant tributary of the River Nile. 
Earlier in 1978, Sudan honored the Camp David’s peace agreement of Egypt 
with Israel and allowed mass flights of the Falasha Jews to Israel (National 
Public Radio, 2013). Although never normalized, the Sudanese-Israeli 
relations worsened along the Red Sea coast by Israeli air attacks on arms cargo 
claimed to have been shipped from Sudan to Hamas in Gaza, and the killing 
of civilians in Port Sudan. BBC News (2011) reported “The then Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ehud Olmert, appeared to give credence to the idea that Israel was 
involved in the attack” and the New York Times (2011) informed that Sudan 
“would take the issue to the United Nations Security Council.” The Sudanese-
Egyptian borders postulated unrelenting national issues, especially a chronic 
dispute since 1955 over the eastern Hala’ib Triangle of which Egypt assumed 
unilateral sovereignty in 1998, irrespective of Sudan’s partnership.  
 
The Research Significance and Objectives 
 Our research aimed to explore strategic implications of the national 
experiences that culminated in the actual seizure of the state’s power or the 
threat of such seizure by Jihadist militants. Major national players had been 
engaged in the fight: Jihadists aiming to control the state and civil society by 
coercion; modern Secularists and Sufi traditionalists competing independently 
to shape the public mind by peaceful activities; and a state pragmatism 
yearning to strike a balance between the contrasting complexities and the 
vested interests of administration by security actions and political reactions, 
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especially when the conflict extended outside the national border to the whole 
world.  
 Because armed opposition exploded over the structures, policies and 
suppression of societal inequalities, it was expedient to understand the 
political environment and the roles international and regional powers played 
in the dilemma. The magnitude indicated increased involvement of global 
powers under a broad anti-terrorism coalition enforcing large-scale military, 
diplomatic, and economic sanctions to resolve the problem, far beyond the 
geographic border (Schaeffer, 2009). Instead of ameliorating the situation, the 
warring efforts failed to touch deeply upon obstacles of democratization and 
the failures in the center-region intra-relations. Added to the large-scale 
inequalities of globalism (Forst, 2009; Solahudin, 2013), besides the tensions 
of inimical rivalries in the region, the crisis was basically exacerbated by 
unresolvable disputes, minorities’ expulsion, religious tensions, and state 
apprehensions.  
 Our contention was centered on the assumption that the uprisings 
erupting between labor groups and the primary appropriators of labor 
functions evolved around the issue of political power rather than class 
struggles over control of the means of production. Until the 1970s, the state 
constituted the actual controller, commissioner, and owner of the key means 
of production (land and most agricultural and industrial resources) and 
maintained the upper hand in trade, development, and investments. The 
private sector reaped huge advantages from privatized state businesses; 
however, it lingered behind by a prevalent tendency to invest in services and 
real estate. The loudest voice of the uprisings was not to eradicate capitalism 
of the private sector whose banks, businesses and other assets had been mainly 
enhanced and protected by the government. Rather, the most popular slogans 
asked for democracy and societal reforms (public freedoms, political 
participation, employment, education, health care, and housing, etc.) by firm 
commitment of the state to the public needs. 
 The achievement of a comprehensive policy-relevant assessment of the 
role of doctrinal percepts in national and global politics was an ultimate target 
of our analysis. Related to several similarities in the socio-economic and 
political settings of Egypt and Sudan, added to their ideological frameworks, 
we made an attempt to clarify the inter-connectedness of state policy-making, 
development planning, and religious orientation in light of the ongoing 
striving. To explore the future of democratization, we focused upon different 
trends of thought and the plans for the future that the Jihadist reactionaries, 
Secularist/Sufi parties, and state authorities most particularly promoted in the 
area: who of these national players struggled constantly to ensure the full 
enjoyment of the freedom of expression and religious tolerance to restrain the 
state’s exclusionary policies and forcible practices. The possible correlations 
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between ideologies, cultural beliefs and political principles; Jihadist coercion; 
the levels of fair distribution of national resources; and the performance of 
state managers and bureaucracy would be deducible in Part two of the research 
by reliable data from advanced cognitive methodologies, community 
conferences, comprehensive public debates, and academic sources.  
 
The jıhadıst, secularıst, and sufı movements  
 To illuminate the research focus, we located three major typologies of 
the contenders facing the challenges of societal equalities: 1) The Shari’a holy 
teachings and practices were genuinely real, applicable core of faith to the 
Believers who perpetuated the Sufi culture; 2) The Secularist thought and 
activities posited an independent praxis from Shari’a, partially inclusionary, 
still exclusionary to the full Shari’a ideals; and 3) The Jihadist reactionary 
doctrines and state collaborative policies applied a symbolic reification of the 
early Muslim Jihad (to defend Islam) in order to manipulate political 
competition by religious tensions. The differences between these typologies 
were quite distinct; albeit, they had been typically blurred. Although the 
differences had been quite distinct, they were often underestimated or ignored.  
 Jihadism struggled against al-Jihad al-akbar, i.e., the greatest self-
contained perseverance of believers, to force Muslim societies to conform to 
a doctrine antagonizing diversity and prohibiting egalitarian co-existence with 
opponents. Secularists emphasized the separation of the state from religious 
institutions. Sufism stressed humility in the service of humanity for the sake 
of God. Before 2015, secularist groups in Egypt included mainly the middle 
and working class parties of al-Wafd, al-Tajamu al-Watani al-Taqadumi, 
Nasserists, independent trade unions and human rights’ groups, and the former 
Mubarak’s NDP. In Sudan, the Communists, SPLM-North, trade unions and 
human rights’ groups voiced the secularists; the Sufi-based Umma and DUP 
were secularly organized sectarian parties. For centuries, the Sufi tariqas 
permeated the countryside and urban areas with enormous following. In Egypt 
today, they included al-Rufaiya, al-Shazaliya, al-Ahmediya, al-Burhamiya, al-
Daifiya, as-Sa’diya, al-Mirghaniya al-Khatmiya, and al-‘Azmiya, etc. In 
Sudan, the major Sufi tariqas included al-Mirghaniya al-Khatmiya, Ansar al-
Mahdi, al-Qadriya, as-Samaniya, al-Ismailiya, al-Idrisiya, and al-Buraiya, etc. 
 In societies sharing a history of inimical colonialism and resilient 
nationalism, the conflict had been expanded by superimposed Shari’a-claimed 
ideologies that generated subtle results upon state authorities and civil 
societies. Egyptian Jihadists spread out resentments by effective media 
campaigns to curtail the Secularist and Sufi activities. Somalia witnessed 
ethno-political aversion in complex situations in which both secular and 
religious groups participated in the feuds by inter-tribal troops. In Tunisia, the 
al-Nahda Islamists ascended to a liberal political structure opened to secular 
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competitiveness. In Sudan, Sufi-based liberal and secular parties created a 
National Democratic Alliance to combat a Jihadist coup that Iran, China, 
Turkey, and Qatar supported to subdue the People of Sudan for economic and 
political gains.  
 Our concept of Jihadism was not confined only to the Egyptian-born 
al-Akhwan al-Muslimeen, i.e., the organization established in the 1920s as a 
voluntary social body. In broad ideological terms, rather than specific 
organizational terms, we would be using the concept interchangeably with 
religious radicals or reactionary conservatives since they supported a full-
fledged political movement aimed to change bureaucracies of the Muslim 
nations to a theocratic empire by all necessary means, including the use of 
force (Mahgoub, 1967; Tal, 2005; Wickham, 2013). ‘Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub 
(1967), the Sudan Communist Party secretary-general, was one of the first to 
depict the Akhwan philosophy “as dangerous as cancer.” The Republican 
Thought (2011) held that Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed Taha and the Republican 
Brothers rejected the same thought and issued Haza ao al-Tofan critique on 
25 December 1984 to abolish the Nimeiri-Akhwan’s September Laws 1983 
that “contradicted and disfigured the Shari’a.”  
 Excepting perhaps the al-Nour al-Salafi Party, which competed in the 
2011 elections with a moderate program recognizing religious tolerance and 
promising to eradicate poverty, even then prohibiting usury and observing 
gender differentiation, the Jihadist bodies in Egypt and Sudan exacerbated 
extremist anti-democratic sections amidst liberal groups. Besides al-Jihad al-
Islami and the Takfeer and Higra armed off-springs, the movement influenced 
a variety of militant groups of which Sudanese NIF, Algerian FIS, Nigerian 
Boko Haram, al-Shabab Somalis, Palestinian Hamas, al-Qa’ida, Ansar Bait al-
Maqdis, and ISIS shared ideological and/or political concerns under different 
programs, leaderships, and agenda. All of these aimed to establish a “peculiar” 
Caliphate that would guarantee them, in the first place, exclusive upper-hand 
powers over the citizenry as excluded non-competing adversaries, with no 
mention of women. The contemporary militants of the caliphate advocated 
indiscriminate violence to terrorize all opponents by ideas and actions entirely 
denounced by both Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. The Muslim heritage of 
religious tolerance and peaceful co-existence with non-Muslims was well-
documented in medieval and contemporary literature (al-Saboni, 1981; Sakr, 
2012). Therefore, the Jihadist contemporary caliphate should be distinguished 
from the classical caliphate of the Muslim heritage, which experienced 
religious tolerance with the Jews and Christians in Dar al-Islam dominions 
under Muslim control, and co-existed peacefully with the Dar al-Harb 
neighboring or distant territories, by peace treaties.  
 Egypt witnessed decades of Mubarak’s policy to restrict the 
Brotherhood’s prowess; but they prospered in businesses and social activities. 
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Despite formal banning and arrests, the group’s independent candidates 
“captured 88 seats” in 2005 and won democratic elections in June 2012 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). Setting to convert Mubarak’s secular state 
into a requisite caliphate by legislature, “Morsi decreed that the courts could 
not challenge his decisions nor hear any lawsuit against the Constituent 
Assembly;” also issued a repressive new law to protect the Revolution 
(Amnesty International, 2013). In Islamic jurisprudence, however, the 
judiciary was independent from the Caliph and governors (Mahmoud, 2013). 
The U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
(2013: 2) read, “On rare occasions the Morsy and interim governments 
prosecuted persons, including security personnel, who committed human 
rights’ abuses … Nongovernmental actors killed several hundred persons, 
including 146 security forces personnel, and attacked government buildings, 
police stations, and Coptic Christians and their property, including churches.” 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2014) relayed, “Morsi’s administration faced 
increasingly vocal opposition in 2013, led by activists who accused the 
incumbents of inaction regarding Egypt’s weak economy, failing public 
services, and deteriorating security situation. A massive protest calling for 
Morsi’s resignation was held on June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of his 
inauguration.” In reaction to violent suppression of the protests, a subsequent 
seizure of political power by the armed forces came about for fear of 
converting the state into a chaotic fate. The jubilant rallies that filled the streets 
in millions of supporters dealt a decisive blow to the presidency (The 
Economist, 2013).  
 The Sufi represented anti-Brotherhood groups in religious and social 
terms. Ideological rivalry and political hostility had often ravaged their 
relationships. Reactionary media attacks on Sufi leaderships included the 
Azhar scholar ‘Ali Jum’a (also Gomaa), the ex-Mufti of Egypt (AlJazeera Net, 
2013). On August 5th, 2016, Dr. Jum’a survived an assassination attempt by 
the Brotherhood’s Hasm movement (BBC News, 2016; Al-Arabiya Net, 
2016). Earlier in Sudan, the Jihadist regime outlawed freedom of the press and 
cultural activities by governmental decrees amidst a series of egregious 
violations of international and national laws (SHRO-Cairo, 1996-2016). 
Adopting the Prophet’s peaceful guidance of the Muslim world in a simple 
way commensurate with the native cultures, the Sufi tradition resembled a 
bottomless philosophical practice of Islam, a spiritual force protecting the poor 
and the powerless; thus becoming an irreconcilable foe to the power-thirst 
Jihadists who venerated the wealthy and glorified the powerful. Mostly 
running a life of austerity and simplicity, the Sufi tariqas existed nearly in 
every Muslim village or town, maintained peaceful relations with non-
Muslims, and enjoyed the high status of religious guides, spiritual mentors, 
and health healers (Mahmoud, 2006). The lacking of Sufi leaderships in the 
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modern economic and political tournaments led them to engage in alliances 
with the Secularist parties and civil society groups that shared their concerns 
for peace, religious tolerance, and public freedoms.  
 In Egypt, such alliances supported the al-Wafd middle-class party in 
parliamentarian elections and might have potentially sympathized with the 
Tajamu al-Watani working class forums, while a few tariqas collaborated with 
Mubarak’s elections as well. In Sudan, the Khatmiya and the Ansar Sufi 
constituted the popular foundation of the Democratic Unionist Party and the 
Umma sectarian parties which ruled the country repeatedly by democratic 
elections. This political reality was founded on the results of the parliamentary 
elections by geographic constituencies: 1953, 1958, 1965, and 1986; Umma 
won 63, 62, 90, and 100 seats and the DUP won 44, 42, 59, and 67 seats 
respectively. Since 1965, the Umma and DUP made several alliances with the 
post-uprising coalition of Jabhat al-Hay’at, the professional unions’ front that 
toppled ‘Abboud dictatorship in October 1964; the unions-led April Uprising 
1985 that overthrew Nimeiri dictatorship; and the National Democratic 
Alliance forums that continued to combat al-Bashir dictatorship up to this day. 
The intermittent periods saw the Umma/DUP/Brotherhood coalition 
governments (Khalid, 1990; Daly, 2010; Digplanet, 2016).  
 The state ruling bodies had been historically rooted in ancient systems 
of tyranny characteristic of pharaohs, kings, royal aristocracies, oligarchic 
centers, colonial masters (Adams, 1997; Lobban, Jr., 2013), and the leaders of 
today who governed by coup d’état or authoritarian governments. The 
centuries’ disaster of these nations reproduced political pathologies 
antagonizing governance relations, the tolerance of ethnic and religious 
diversity, and the respect for human rights and public freedoms. The state 
structures and political ventures never truly reconciled with the cultural and 
religious systems of the largely Bedouin or farming peoples they repressively 
ruled. The people made the effective force that geared and engineered popular 
uprisings; yet, many a time, the power reaping the outcome was nothing but 
the state itself, namely the bureaucratic apparatus planning, reacting, and 
acting on behalf of Authority.  
 Upholding strong traditions of autonomy with patriotism, bravery, and 
generosity, the indigenous peoples engaged in lasting antagonisms versus the 
coercive role of the state which often reacted with hostilities to subdue the 
populace. In transitional periods, following a few popular uprisings that forced 
temporal changes in the government’s hierarchy and performance, succeeding 
rulers would promise to modify the system; notwithstanding, progression was 
never accessible in the absence of popular participation in national decision-
making. Evidently, the state and her managers figured out in the public mind 
as a symbol of corruption, mentor of civil wars, generator of uneven 
development, and a permanent depressant of democracy and national unity. 
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The Sufi and Secularist groups believed that this situation was particularly true 
of the Jihadist ideologues that never ceased to plan on holding the power of 
state by all means possible.  
 Evaluating the shortcomings and failures of the potential to popularize 
state performance, the most effective tool of social change, this research 
mirrored real concerns of a popular movement over doable ways to recover 
the democratic participation and well-being of all those opposing the Jihad 
single-minded advocacies. This included explorations on the root causes of 
coercion and the use of force which worsened over-arching ethno-religious 
engagements by the Jihad suppression and state repression, while failing the 
possible remedies to eradicate them. Unfolding complex correlations of these 
variables was significantly helpful within our theoretical framework to assess 
the national and international pursuit of peace and stability. To probe into these 
issues, we analyzed the defaulted aspects of development and 
democratization. 
 
The issues of societal inequalities  
 Grossly violated human rights, anti-democratic politics, and wasteful 
expenditures constituted deficiencies of the repressive regimes that factorized 
protracted inequalities in the Arab-African context (AOHR, 2015). On the 
other side, the short-lived democracies that made the effort to advance societal 
equalities did not yield sustainable development to promote the living 
standards of people. Taking advantage of the failures, the growth of Jihadist 
organizations, as well as extensive formulations in several Asian countries and 
Gulf States, motivated the state to circumvent civil and political rights to 
consolidate power relations.  
 International humanitarian law and the teachings of Islam exhibited a 
wide range of consistency by overlapping provisions of the right to life and 
the freedom of faith and religious tolerance, etc. This promising consensus 
was frequently broken by political invasion in juxtaposition with legal 
indoctrination. The Jihadists believed that international human rights’ norms 
contradicted the fundamental rules of Muslim jurisprudence on obligations; 
the laws of inheritance; polygamous marriages; and physical punishments. 
They also considered anti-religious the model of regular democracy vis-à-vis 
the Muslim thought that recognized individual responsibilities and public 
consultancy in the state policies. To monopolize the national decision-making, 
they struggled fiercely to install theocratic governments to undermine 
democratization processes, the most reliable guarantee of public freedoms in 
modern societies. In a few democracies, systematic planning had been 
enforceable to enhance popular participation; all the same, the Jihadist denial 
of the Secularist inputs in the transition to democratic rule (e.g., Sudan 1964-
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69; 1985-89) disrupted the efforts to bring about peace and national 
reconciliation.  
 These partisan stands spawned a wide rift between the forces of 
secularism, civil society, and the Sufi traditionalists on one side, and the state 
managers aligned with theocratic ideologies on the other. In the meantime, 
uneven development, high levels of impoverishment, and the failure of 
governments to develop marginal regions created the largest pool of jihadist 
recruitment to overpower the authorities amongst the rural population and 
their membership in the public service. The complete absence of regular 
democracy exposed society to unparalleled enmity by the contending parties 
while the state acted desperately to strike a political balance in its own right. 
The state managers under Mubarak, at some point, seemed to allow 
reactionary leaderships to thrive economically in lieu of a final withdrawal of 
the political scene. Ironically, the isolated group utilized the resultant financial 
leverage over businesses and real estate to control a wide range of social and 
religious networking; only to dominate democratic elections as soon as the 
Authority gave way to popular uprisings.  
 The final outcome culminated in the Brotherhood’s takeover of the 
state by a military coup in Sudan (1989). The legitimate Command of the 
Sudanese Armed Forces reported immediate attacks by the coup forces on the 
commander-in-chief General Fathi Ahmed ‘Ali and his assistants; the extra-
judicial killings of officers and regulars in the holy month of Ramadan/April 
1990; and a long list of criminal killings and tortures of civilian and/or military 
opponents (SHRO-Cairo, 1992). Parmar (2007: 2) mentioned that,”In 2000, 
Bashir was re-elected, and his NC/NIF political party won 340 out of 360 seats 
in the Parliament in deeply flawed elections boycotted by all major opposition 
parties. NC/NIF members and supporters continued to hold key positions in 
the Government, security forces, judiciary, academic institutions, trade 
unions, professional associations, and the media." The domination of the 
state’s executive, legislative, and judicial powers occurred in Egypt by a 
democratically elected rule (2012-13), and the unrelenting Jihadist striving to 
control the political arena persisted in Syria, Jordon, Mali, Nigeria, Gulf 
States, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, etc. The Jihadists’ seizure of 
political power did not evidently fulfill the human rights of people. Instead, 
the security policies of the Morsi shortened governance and al-Bashir 
prolonged rule empowered reactionary groups to unsettle the civil values and 
secular systems of the public life. The anti-democratic orientations were 
aggravated further by civil wars and heavy security expenditures, additional 
to unresolvable animosities in the center-urban and periphery relations. 
 The January 2012’s Uprising and the as-Sisi succeeding regime 
revealed that a growing popular movement supported the peaceful Sufi culture 
and the secular legal activism as a viable Path to advance democratization. In 
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2013, the Tamarud youth movement gathered millions of supporters to vote 
down the Morsi governance (Al-Arabiya Net, 2013). In the 2015’s parliament, 
350 Independents strengthened as-Sisi coalition fi Da’m Misr (Alyaum, 2016). 
To run a healthy life for the whole populace, mounting cooperation was quite 
evident between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups, and the means for 
manifesting national amalgamation seemed at least intellectually possible 
between the Church and the Mosque. Such integration was required to curb 
the Jihadist exclusionary policies and their theocratic mentors in the Morsi 
reign. The Brotherhood’s TV channels and media (e.g., al-Thao-ra and the 
Turkey-based al-Sharq channels), supported by the AlJazeera TV of Qatar, 
had been rampant with innumerable programs denying legitimacy of as-Sisi 
regime and advocating extreme intolerance to Egypt’s secularism. The state’s 
media and a number of non-governmental organizations counteracted these 
channels vehemently. Here, further steps might have been approved to 
maintain robust standards of democratization, had the state abandoned security 
viciousness to be able to adjust to the full terms of peaceful co-existence with 
all contenders. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic-authoritarian structure of the 
state would soon restrain the popular movement by restrictive measures on the 
freedom of journalists and demonstrators, even in post-revolutionary times. 
Despite national consensus on a democratic constitution and elections in 2014, 
concrete bonds of trust remained to be seen between the popular movement 
and the new government. 
 The human rights’ record in Africa had been notorious for gross 
violations of both international and national laws by intrusions of state 
managers, armed forces and intelligence agencies, as well as revolutionaries 
in battle with the state (Mahmoud, 2005). The colonial policies had earlier laid 
the ground by ethno-regional, administrative, and political divisions for Africa 
to suffer low levels of living standards, embedded poverty, high 
unemployment, deteriorated health conditions, high infant mortality rates, 
poor educational levels, and corrupted officials. An urban-rural dichotomy 
became the source of immense inequalities when the concentration of modern 
services and amenities marginalized vast populations and pushed the rural 
residents to live in shanty towns surrounding the debilitated centers. This 
incapacitating environment, in its turn, exacerbated high unemployment, low 
incomes, and endemic illnesses as indicated in the World Bank statistics on 
sustainable development (Freestone, 2012).  
 The African nations were caught by the yoke of suppressive rulers 
(Hameso, 1997; Zoubair, 1999; Mwakikagile, 2009). The scope of the 
violations amounted to cases of genocide and other crimes against humanity 
in Rwanda and Darfur, in addition to the abuse of authority by heinous extra-
judicial killings, women’s degradation, tortures of political opponents, 
arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions, and economic crimes. From their 
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
33 
part, the opposition forces followed suit, as they initiated attacks or responded 
to suppression. Long years of deep mistrust between law enforcement 
agencies and the political opponents and human rights’ activists continued 
uninterruptedly even in the transitional periods to democratic rule (Sudan: 
1985-1989; Egypt: 2012 to the present). Amnesty International had been 
reporting gross violations in Sudan, as well as activists’ disappearances and 
tortures in Egypt; the authorities denied all violations. Moreover, the country 
reports of the U.S. State Department, AOHR, and Human Rights Watch 
(1990s-2000s) affirmed that a great many innocent civilians bore the brunt of 
battles launched by the warring parties in disregard of international norms.  
 The post-independence governments maintained the same trend of 
uneven development. Receiving most development projects versus the 
underdeveloped Sa’eed (South), Egypt’s Delta, north of the country, enjoyed 
modern life and the bulk of industry and agriculture. In Central Sudan, the 
agricultural Gazira and Rahad permanent irrigation schemes made up the main 
infrastructure of the national economy together with sugar, textiles, and other 
investments. Both countries suffered highly corrupt public sectors. 
Transparency International corruption perception index (2015) indicated in a 
scale of 100 Egypt’s score was 36; Sudan’s score was 12. Alongside consumer 
support programs to reduce poverty, es-Sisi presidency imposed harsh 
measures to deal with corruption. Sudan National Audit Chamber’s annual 
reports on stolen public money in millions of dollars were never heeded by the 
state’s competent authorities. Both countries were heavily burdened with debt; 
by December 2014 Egypt government debt to GDP amounted to 90.50 percent 
of the country’s GDP and Sudan’s was 79 percent (Trading economics, 2016). 
Most provinces remained basically pauperized, even though they contained 
substantial manpower of the country and a large reservoir of minerals and 
agricultural land. Both countries were oil-producing; albeit the Sudanese oil 
became a North-South source of resentment soon after it had been discovered 
in the mid-1980s.  
 The national finances of the Nile beneficiaries would furthermore 
complain from huge expenditures of warfare and security operations to 
eliminate the recruits of impoverishment: the challenging militants in Sudan 
and the Jihadist militias in Egypt. An ever-increasing population growth (UN 
estimated 93.2 million Egyptians in 2016; fertility rate 3.3) continued, inter 
alia, to deplete the national resources. Additionally, tourism had been a target 
of terrorist attacks that did not help to sustain the revenue. In this context, our 
research questioned the eligibility of the Sufi/Secular groups that recognized 
the ethics of religion and the need to abide-by international norms to lead the 
state to advance societal equity by permanent peace, religious tolerance, and 
even development. The accomplishment of these agenda would have possibly 
helped to enhance democracy and human rights. It might have equally 
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strengthened the peaceful co-existence of the Christian Copts with the 
majority Muslims.  
  
The escalated ideological confrontations 
 The Shari’a fundamental sources defined as the Holy Qur’an and the 
Prophet’s authentic Sunna, regardless of different views within the madhhabs 
(a multiplicity of jurist schools with legal insights) had been recognized by the 
Muslims as pure ideals over space and time. These ideals fixed the 
construction and permanent sustenance of an ultimate universal society, 
necessarily founded on the devout belief in God and His Messenger 
Muhammad and a peaceful exercise of individuality and gender equality 
within a godly-defined cosmology. This cosmology was succinctly explained 
in daily media programs by the al-Azhar jurists (interviews in Egypt T.V., 
2015-16). In the case of Sudan, “Shari’a symbolic status is still retained” 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 2012, p. 22). Under the Jihadist rule, nonetheless, gender 
equality had been eliminated by women’s enslavement (CNN, 2014), 
harassment )Al-Arabiya, 2012(, and beatings )Syriapromise, 2010).  
 Was it possible to move Sudan, Egypt, and the nations victimized by 
inextricable failures to adopt the genuine tenets and noble teachings of the 
Shari’a fitra, instead of the Jihadist and the state’s vehemence? To what extent 
would Sufism, Secularism, Jihadism, and the Authority’s instrumental 
symbolism of the Shari’a zahir [evident rules] come to terms with the Shari’a 
batin [Truth]? Such movement could have been possible within a principled 
acceptance of the authentic concepts and interpretations of Islam. Egypt’s al-
Azhar University had been recognized as the state’s guardian of this heritage. 
The Azhar Grand Imams, Mohamed ‘Abdu, Mahmoud Shaltut, ‘Abd al-Halim 
Mahmoud, Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, as well as today’s Imam Ahmed al-
Tayeb, led progressive campaigns to correct the Jihadists’ dogmatic thought. 
And yet, the debate persisted in political crossings for which inclusionary 
solutions couldn’t have been solely pursued by the Imams’ capacity which 
received profound support only recently from as-Sisi presidency. 
 The unabated conflicts in the Muslim world between the authorities 
and the opposition communities and organizational bodies might possibly 
continue in the 21st century the way that many of them escalated in the 20ieth 
century. While the challenges awaiting the three typologies touched upon the 
way long-enduring disputes might have been peacefully ended in the domestic 
life, misconceptions became part of the global strategies to combat the 
prevailing tensions. As happened, some critics asked for “changes” in the texts 
of Islam to be fit for coexistence with the critics’ culture, while others 
portrayed the Prophet of Islam by sarcastic cartoons - an offensive that fueled 
negative reactions and unleashed revulsion. Calls aiming at Muslim concepts 
to change their support to Islam (Counter Jihad Report, 2012) did not match 
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the authenticity of ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib; the eloquence of Abu Hanifa, Mohamed 
‘Abdu and Mohamed Abu-Zahra; the scholarly works of ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Wahid 
Wafi, ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Owda, Radwan al-Sayed, and Roje Garody, among 
many others; or the plans to authenticate Shari’a concepts by Muslim 
contemporary jurists (BBC News, 2008).  
 In Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence (2013), we reviewed the literature 
on Islamic Justice from the first Muslim Medina state in the history of mankind 
to contemporary debates on the future of Islamic succession, whether a strict 
return to the Medina model state or a multifarious adoption of modern 
constitutional forms. The findings of our journey aimed to help the non-
Muslim world to understand this unique thought towards a new era of mutual 
understanding. The shared issues of human development would be attainable 
by a broad, well-versed knowledge to end the deep discrepancies that divided 
mankind across the South-North geopolitics and the East-West dichotomies 
(Halliday, 2003; Khan, 2006; Schaeffer, 2009). Not only that many Muslim 
and Western nations, in general, suffered a dire need to promote East-West 
mutual understanding in all aspects of modernity. Muslim societies, in 
particular, yearned to enjoy a great deal of mutual understanding between the 
Sunni and Shiite doctrines, as well as the secularist and non-secularist 
adversaries. So much as needed to appreciate the secularist thought and 
strategic plans to ensure stability, it was equally essential to understand the 
Shari’a fitra, ideals and principled teachings for the same purpose.  
 
Conclusions 
 The civil society and human rights’ pressures to secularize political life 
in Sudan and Egypt associated state democratization with the struggle for 
public and individual freedoms. Our research examined major features of the 
Sufi and Secularist dynamism versus the Jihadist activism for a theocratic 
state. We argued the Sufi and Secularist popular competencies had historically 
shaped the behavior of individuals and groups via a wide spectrum of cultural 
practices in peaceful political exchange. While most governments failed to 
reduce the political contradictions, or to ease authority abuses by security 
options, the Jihadist reactionaries spread chaos and violence. The overthrow 
of the Brotherhood rule in Egypt (2013) marked a significant sign of inevitable 
decline in the theocratic planning to rule, even by democratic elections. In 
Sudan, whereby the authorities aligned with reactionaries to suppress liberties, 
the ensuing alliance increased societal instability for it lacked the secularist 
support and the bonds of social trust Sufi groups maintained over centuries for 
the vast majority of the populace. Inversely, the Sufi and the Secularists lined 
up in subtle gatherings to protest the sponsored theocracy. Secularist groups 
had already predicted a speedy fall of the theocratic ideology to convert the 
state’s autonomy to a religious polity. Still, many observers were suspicious 
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of this expectation in doctrinal terms based on the resistance of deeply-rooted 
loyalties that would unlikely surrender to a secular regime. 
 International humanitarian law and Shari’a ideals shared a wide range 
of acceptability to the right to life, work and religious beliefs, and the civil 
rights and freedoms that seldom were firmly legislated or guaranteed by state 
bureaucracies (SHRO-Cairo, 2010). For example, the Bill of Rights in Sudan’s 
Transitional Constitution postulated a high status of human rights which never 
were seriously manifested by the Jihadist-indoctrinated administrations, let 
alone the security, intelligence, and armed forces. Because Sufi Islam was the 
nearest to the Shari’a teachings that were partially shared with secular groups, 
we argued that a viable way to correct the symbolic manipulation of the 
Shari’a could be properly maintained by a broad, community-based 
recognition of the culture and structure of Sufism in the Muslim nations. This 
strategy might be successfully accomplished in equal terms with the 
secularism that recognized the benevolent originality of Islam - a far-sighted 
strategy to realize intersection of the Muslim batin Truth and the international 
human rights’ norms.  
 Academic research on these areas had not been adequately known, and, 
as noted, some works were awfully misinformed. In light of several 
movements resisting the central government in the countryside (Sinai Jihadists 
in Egypt and the armed groups in Sudan), our analysis of the societal crisis 
raised critical questions on the destinies of the Jihadist, Secularist, and Sufi 
entities, as well as horizons of the state’s unity and integrity. Evidently, there 
was a parallel need to forecast the future of these typologies in the long run: 
other than the Sufi, who of the contenders would most likely transcend 
adversities to elevate the social equalities? Would a reversed movement by the 
Sufi groups from cities and towns to the countryside pacify, or rather reify the 
popular resistance to the Center’s suppression? What if the Sufi tradition 
acquiesced to the Jihad sedition to eradicate secularism and democratic ideals 
all together? The 2015 parliament contained 65 Misriyeen Ahrar, 50 
Mustaqbal al-Watan, and 85 seats for more than 10 new groups. Old parties 
won 45 Wafd, one Tajamu, and Nur as-Salafi won 11 (Alyaum, 2015). What 
factors weakened the Tajamu programs in Egypt and undermined the 
Communist secularism in Sudan? How sustainable would it be for the popular 
movement vis-à-vis the state’s centripetal power?  
 Part one of the research analyzed the state Jihadist-Sufi/Secularist 
crisis which, nevertheless, was not entirely domestic. Competing for the 
resurrection of a caliphate over Muslim nations for material interests, Iran, 
Turkey, and their surrogate Qatar supported the Jihadist reactionaries in Sudan 
and Egypt. Contrariwise, the U.S. and the EU provided lucrative support to 
Hosni Mubarak secular regime; but they showed restricted aid to the newly 
elected government which re-established civility of the state’s judicial, 
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executive, and legislative regularities by a plebiscite road-map, and declared 
war on terrorism in the region. The as-Sisi restoration of the Egyptian state 
would successfully make a Saudi-led deal with the Emirates and Kuwait and 
a series of trade agreements with India, Russia, China, and Germany (HSBC, 
2013; Arabi 21, 2016) to boost the economy in a new political environment. 
We noted that the Sudanese-Egyptian Takamul, Hala’ib dispute, and other 
border tensions were not finally resolved. The Jihadists’ government 
reactivated relations with Egypt, broke a lifelong dependency on Iran, and 
supported the Saudi war in Yemen. Implications of these maneuvers might 
help to initiate follow-up studies in Part two of the research to project the 
future of the two nations, as they moved into crossroads in a quagmire of 
conflicting bodes. 
 
References: 
Adams, William Y. Nubia (1977). Corridor to Africa. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Al-Arabiya Net (2016). Hasm of the Akhwan claims the assassination attempt 
on Jum’a (Arabic):  http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-
world/egypt/2016/08/05 (5 August 2016). 
Al-Arabiya (2014). Police arrests 7 men by the video on sexual harassment at 
the Tahrir square (Arabic): http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-
world/egypt/2014/06/10 (12 June 2014). 
Al-Arabiya Net (2013). Harakat Tamarud al-Misriya: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/egypt/2013/05/21/ ةكرح-درمت-
ةيرصملا) (21 May 2013). 
Al Jazeera Net (2013). al-Raysoni accuses Jum’a of acting against Islamic 
jurisprudence (Arabic): http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/10/13. 
Alyaum (2016). al-ahzab al-Misriya taeesh fi qayboba siyasiya: 
alyaum.com/article/4122711 (28 February 2016).   
Alyaum (2015). Egyptian elections (Arabic): 
www.youm7.com/story/2015/12/3/65. 
Amnesty International (2013). Annual Report: Egypt 2013: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-egypt-2013 (May 
23, 2013). 
AOHR (2015). Study on the links between economic and social rights and 
legal empowerment of the poor in the Arab world (Arabic): 
http://aohr.net/en/category/studies (July 5, 2015). 
Arabi 21 (2016). $45 billion Saudi-Egyptian agreements in 10 days (Arabic): 
http://arabi21.org/story/900721 (10 April 2016). 
Ashley, David & Orenstein, David Michael (2001). Sociological Theory 
classical statements. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
38 
BBC News (2016). Jum’a survived an assassination attempt on his life, 
announced Egypt’s Interior (Arabic): 
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2016/08/160805_ali_gomaa_egypt (5 
August 2016). 
BBC News (2015). Saudis announce Islamic anti-terrorism coalition – BBC 
News – BBC.com: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35099318 
(15 December 2015). 
BBC News (2011). Sudan accuses Israel over Port Sudan air strike at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12986864 (6 April 2011). 
BBC News (2008). Robert Pigott “Turkey in radical revision of Islamic texts”: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7264903.stm (26 February 2008). 
Bradshaw, York W. & Wallace, Michael (1997). Global Inequalities. 
Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press. 
CNN (2014). Salma Abdelaziz “Isis states its justification for the enslavement 
of women”: http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/12/world/meast/isis-justification-
slavery/index.html (updated October 13, 2014). 
Daly, M. W. (2010). Darfur’s Sorrow the forgotten history of a humanitarian 
disaster. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press. 
Davis, John (2013). The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: unfinished revolutions 
and the quest for democracy. Surrey. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Digplanet (2016). Sudanese parliamentary elections, 1965. Retrieved from: 
http://www.digplanet.com/wiki/Sudanese_parliamentary_election,_1965 
(copyright 2009-2016). 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2014). Muslim Brotherhood: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-Brotherhood (11-14-2014). 
Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn (2012). Shari'a and Islamism in Sudan. London: I. B. 
Tauris. 
Forst, Brian (2009). Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Freestone, David (2012). The World Bank and Sustainable Development. 
Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers.   
Gana, Nouri (2013). The Making of the Tunisian Revolution. Scotland: 
Edinburgh University. 
Hafez, Mohammed M (2003). Why Muslims Rebel - Repression and 
Resistance in the Islamic World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Halliday, Fred (2003). Islam and the Myth of Confrontation - Religion and 
Politics in the Middle East. London: I. B. Tauris. 
Hameso, Seyoum Y (1997). Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa. N.Y.: Nova 
Science Publishers.   
HSBC (2013). Global Connections. Trade forecast tool: 
https://globalconnections.hsbc.com/us/en/tools-data/trade-forecasts/eg (09 
December 2013), http://arabi21.org/story/900721. 
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
39 
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1996). Egypt Islam and Democracy: Twelve Critical 
Essays. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. 
International Criminal Court (2010). Al Bashir Case – the Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir: ICC-02/05-01/09 at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur/albashir?ln=en (12 July 2010). 
Khalid, Mansour (1990). Government they deserve. London: Kegan Paul.  
Khan, M. A. Muqtedar (ED) (2006). Islamic Democratic Discourse - Theory, 
Debates and Philosophical Perspectives. London: Lexington. 
Lobban Jr., Richard (2013). Historical Dictionary of Ancient and Medieval 
Nubia. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. 
Lobban Jr., Richard (2010). A Global Security Watch – Sudan. ABC-
CLIO/Greenwood: Praeger Security International. 
Mahgoub, ‘Abd al-Khaliq (1967). Afkar hawla Falsafat al-Akhwan al-
Muslimeen. Omdurman: SCP.  
Mahmoud, Mahgoub El-Tigani (2013). Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence Law 
and Justice in Islam. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press. 
Mahmoud, Mahgoub (2006). Sufism. In: Encyclopedia of Anthropology edited 
by H. James Birx, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Mahmoud, Mahgoub El-Tigani (2005). Human Rights in Africa. Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellen Press. 
Moore, C. Henry (1970). Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Mwakikagile, Godfrey (2009). Africa after Independence, realities of 
nationhood (3rd edition). Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press. 
National Public Radio (NPR) (2013). Last flight of Ethiopia-to-Israel Jewish 
migration program: http://www.npr.org/2013/09/01/217356628/last-flight-of-
ethiopia-to-israel-jewish-migration-program (September 1, 2013).  
al-Nour al-Salafi (2011). Parnamij Hizb al-Nour al-Salafi: 
http://www.damatsoft.com/21287. 
Parmar, Sharanjeet (2007). An Overview of the Sudanese Legal System and 
Legal Research, Hauser Global Law School Program, N.Y.: New York 
University: 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Sudan.html#_Introduction_%E2%80
%93_The_cultural%20and%20leg (published January 2007). 
Reeves, Eric (2004). Khartoum’s central role in the assassination attempt on 
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, October 3, 2001: 
http://sudanreeves.org/2004/12/20/khartoums-central-role-in-the-
assassination-attempt-on-egyptian-president-hosni-mubarak-october (20 
December 2004). 
al-Saboni, Mohamed ‘Ali (1981). Mukhtasar Ibn Kathir. Beirut: Dar al-Gabal.  
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
40 
Sakr, Ahmed H. (2012). Non-Muslims in Muslim History, Lombard: Islamic 
Research Foundation International, Inc.: 
irfi.org/.../nonmuslims_in_muslim_history (copyright 1988-2012). 
Schaeffer, Robert (2009). Understanding Globalization. Lanham: Roman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Security Council Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006). N.Y. United 
Nations: 
http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legalinstruments.shtml;http://www.u
n.org/en/sc/ctc/action.html. 
SHRO-Cairo (2016). Sudan Human Rights Organization different reports and 
press releases on human rights violations in Sudan: (1996-2016): 
http://shrocairo_updated.org. 
SHRO-Cairo (2010). Stop violating the rights and public liberties - Call on the 
abrogation of September Laws: shrocairo_updated.org (September 25th, 
2010). 
SHRO-Cairo (1992). Report by the Legitimate Command of the Sudanese 
Armed Forces. In Arabic: Conference on human rights in Sudan convened by 
SHRO, the Arab Lawyers Union, and Fund for Peace, Cairo (November 
1992). 
Solahudin (2013). The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: from Darul Islam to 
Jem'ah Islamiyah. Dave McRae (translator), Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Syriapromise (2010). Police beatings of a Sudanese girl (Arabic): 
syriapromise.wordpress.com/2010/12/09. 
Tal, Nachman (2005). Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan. Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press.  
The Counter Jihad Report (2012). Factual persuasion: changing the minds of 
Islam’s supporters: https://counterjihadreport.com/2012/01/01/factual-
persuasion-changing-the-minds-of-islams-supporters-2/ (posted January 1, 
2012). 
The Economist (2013). Egypt’s coup the second time around: 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21580533-egyptian-army-
widespread-popular-support-has-ended-presidency-muhammad-morsi (Jul 
6th, 2013). 
The New York Times (2011). Josh Kron “Sudan says Israel launched a missile 
strike on a car, killing 2”: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/world/africa/07sudan.html?_r=0 (April 
6, 2011). 
The Republican Thought (2011). Haza ao al-Tofan the leaflet for which Taha 
and four of his disciples were sentenced with death penalty (Arabic): 
http://www.alfikra.org/article_page_view_a.php?article_id=54&page_id=1 
(25 December 1984). 
European Scientific Journal September 2016 edition vol.12, No.26  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
41 
Trading Economics (2016). Egypt government debt to gross domestic product: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/government-debt-to-gdp (copyright 
2016). 
Transparency International (2015). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved 
from:  http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 
U.S. Department of State (2015).  U.S. Relations with Sudan fact sheet: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm November 3, 2015). 
U.S. Department of State (2013). Egypt 2013 Human Rights Report: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220562.pdf (updated 3/05/14, 
p.2). 
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky (2013). The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an 
Islamist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
World Bank (2016). Population Estimates and Projections, Washington, DC. 
Retrieved from: data.worldbank.org.DataCatalog, WDC, 2016; on poverty & 
equity: data.worldbank.org; 
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/EGY;povertydata.worldba
nk.org/poverty/country/SDN; and worldbank.org/en/country/Sudan.  
Zoubair, Yahia H (1999). North Africa in Transition: state, society, and 
economic transformation in the 1990s. Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida. 
 
  
